The million-dollar question here is whether such dilemmas will generate citizen calls for the national state to step in again, adopting its historical role in shielding citizens from the vagaries of market so as to eliminate social and spatial inequalities across the national territory, including those that sustained violence and competing sovereignties. Very similar mandates served to consolidate state formation and helped legitimize the actions of developmental states in prior periods, but the devolution of state power to the locality has challenged this historical model, or at least its territorial scale. In the new environment of chronic urban violence, the question is not merely whether state capacity can be restored, but at what spatial scale, with whose sanction and support, and attached to which forms of sovereignty, fragmented or otherwise. At this stage, one can only conclude that these are still open questions whose answers are yet to be revealed.

4

Unpacking the State's Uneven Territorial Reach: Evidence from Latin America

Agustina Giraudy and Juan Pablo Luna

INTRODUCTION

In the introductory chapter to this volume, Centeno, Kohli, and Yashar emphasize the importance of *political action* and *social context* and their interaction with state institutions to explain state capacity and state performance for development. Drawing on this key insight, in this chapter we focus on the interactions between state actors and what we refer to as territorial challengers (see description below), and explore how these interactions shape the prospects for state territorial reach (STR).[1] In particular, the chapter analyzes the multiple instances in which the territorial reach of the state results in uneven penetration within countries, that is, in an unequal presence of the state across subnational units. In addition, the chapter provides new conceptual categories for systematically identifying these varied situations.

We make two central claims about STR. First, we contend that STR is an intrinsically political and distributive outcome that results from clashes and negotiations between national-level state officials and territorial challengers over the control of territory. Second, we argue that the power of state actors to control territory is not absolute but relative. A major implication that derives from these two ideas is that both state officials and territorial challengers, as well as their respective incentives and resources, are critical for shaping STR unevenness.

[1] As noted in Chapter 1 of this volume, the territorial reach of the state is one of the key indicators of state capacity.

Building on these claims, the chapter proposes a new typology that crosstabulates state officials' with territorial challengers' incentives and access to resources to control the territory. The typology yields three ideal types of STR: *restricted*, *contested*, and *unprojected*. Drawing on the contributions of recent scholarship on state capacity and on political order and authority in civil wars, we further identify two subtypes for the contested and restricted STR types: open-contested and within-state contested STR, as well as mutualistic-restricted and pure-restricted STR. Aside from presenting a novel typology of uneven STR, the chapter also offers empirical analyses to demonstrate that the territorial reach of the state is highly uneven in some regions of the world, and that, as expected from the typology, different types of uneven STR exist in practice.

The chapter is organized as follows. The next section defines STR, discusses its core elements, and introduces the typology of STR. The third section evaluates empirically the potential payoffs of the typology. First, drawing on satellite electrification data we analyze the degree to which subnational electrification – an indicator of state territorial reach – is heterogeneously distributed across the territory across various world regions. Second, the empirical section also maps out each of the uneven STR types by providing concrete examples of state officials' and territorial challengers' interactions drawn from original fieldwork conducted in Argentina, Mexico, Peru, and Paraguay. The final section reflects on the analytic payoffs for the study of uneven STR that can be derived from the relational notion of STR and the STR typology. This concluding section also explores potential future research agendas that may result from this study.

Before analyzing the core elements of STR, two qualifications about territorial challengers are in order.[2] First, the agents that we call "territorial challengers" can be state or nonstate actors. Nonstate actors include insurgent groups, armed rebels, drug traffickers, and warlords, and are typically seen as the most obvious examples of nonstate territorial challengers. Drawing on literature on democratic consolidation, the rule of law, and social movements, we claim that other state and nonstate actors, such as indigenous groups seeking territorial autonomy to defend communal models of governance, or autocratic governors or mayors who control subnational (or authoritarian) enclaves, also constitute territorial challengers who actively seek to limit the territorial reach of the state.

[2] We draw on Eaton's (2012) conceptualization of "territorial challengers."

Second, territorial challengers differ significantly from subnational territorial actors, such as organized social movements which, despite challenging the state and the existing social and political order, want more (rather than less) state presence. These types of challengers usually confront the state in order to obtain a better provision of public goods, such as schools, roads, clinics, protection, and law enforcement, among others (Slater 2010; vom Hau and Wilde 2010). The territorial challengers addressed in this chapter are characterized by efforts to neutralize the authority of the state (and/or their regulations and institutions) in the territories state officials formally govern. As conceived of in this chapter, territorial challengers are driven by the fundamental necessity to gain and/or secure territorial control in order to maximize its byproducts (Arjona 2013; Trejo and Ley 2014).[3]

DEFINITION AND TYPOLOGY OF STR

The uneven territorial reach of the state over the periphery (or subnational units) it nominally controls figures prominently in studies of political science. Studies on democratic consolidation,[4] civil war and warzones,[5] warlords and warzones,[6] state building,[7] public goods provision,[8] subnational undemocratic regimes,[9] violence,[10] and the (un)rule of law[11] have shown that the capacity of the state to implement and enforce established

[3] The benefits that arise from this control vary significantly, and they may include control over material resources, land, persons, local officials, key roads and commercial routes, social networks, economic proceeds (such as taxes), and voters, among others.

[4] O'Donnell 1993; Linz and Stepan 1996. [5] Fearon 2004a; Fearon and Laitin 2003.

[6] Fearon 2004b; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Wickham-Crowley 1987; Wood 2003; Marten 2012; Arjona 2013; Mampilly 2011; Metelis 2010; J. Weinstein 2007; Skaperdas and Syropoulos 1997; Arjona, et al. 2014; Kalyvas 2006, 2008; Staniland 2010, 2012; Boix 2008; Gutiérrez Sanín 2008; Hull 2010; K. Cunningham, et al. 2012.

[7] Tilly 1975, 1990; Ertman 1997; Berman 2011; Ziblatt 2006; Slater 2010; Vergara 2012; Soifer 2015.

[8] Skocpol 1992; Ziblatt 2006.

[9] McMann 2006; E. Gibson 2005, 2013; Gervasoni 2010; Giraudy 2010, 2013, 2015; Cornelius 1999.

[10] Moncada 2010; Lessing 2012; Durán-Martínez 2013; Snyder and Durán Martínez 2009; Arias 2006a, 2013; Astorga and Shirk 2010; Arias and Goldstein 2010; Cruz 2009; Alonso, et al. 2007; Andreas and Wallman 2009; Bailey and Chabat 2002; Caldeira 2001; Davis and Duren 2012; Frühling, et al. 2003; Gambetta 1996; Grayson 2010; Gutiérrez and Jaramillo 2004; Medina Franco 2006; Moser 2004; Moser and McIlwaine 2004; Palacios and Serrano 2010; Jones and Rodgers 2009; Staniland 2012; L. Weinstein 2008.

[11] O'Donnell 1993; Méndez, et al. 1999.

rules and procedures is exerted in a territorially uneven fashion.[12] Analyzing countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, these works generally identify at least three different types of uneven STR. A first type has been identified in countries affected by civil wars, such as Colombia, Uganda, or El Salvador. In each of these cases, state authorities cannot homogeneously reach throughout the periphery because armed groups, insurgents, warlords, or indigenous groups have displaced officials in subnational units. These groups, rather than state officials, exert actual and absolute political and territorial dominion over these territories (Arjona 2013; Kasfir 2004; Wood 2003). A slightly different form of displacement of national officials from peripheral territories, which has also been denoted as an instance of uneven STR, can be identified in countries where nondemocratic rulers govern in peripheral regions. Studies on the United States, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, to name a few, show that local subnational officials – including autocratic mayors and governors – were able to defy national state authorities' attempts to trickle the rule of law or democracy down, and to prevent the implementation of national policies in lower-tier governments (E. Gibson 2013; Hagopian 1996; Benton 2012; Giraudy 2015).

A second type of uneven STR has existed in some countries, such as in Peru in the mid twentieth century and in parts of Africa in the postcolonial era, where state authorities did not reach out into subnational (peripheral) regions due to the existence of difficult-to-access zones within the national territory (Yashar 2005; Herbst 2000; for an analogous situation, see Scott 2009). Finally, a third type of uneven STR has been employed to denote instances where violent clashes between state officials and rebel groups have resulted in stalemates in which neither actor is able to reclaim sovereignty over the territory, as seen in the recent war in El Salvador (Wood 2003).

Despite the fact that these are situations and empirical cases that, in practice and by relevant scholarly standards, differ widely from each other, they have typically been denoted and categorized under the "uneven STR" label. This, we believe, is problematic. First and foremost, it shows that uneven STR has been subject to conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970), and concomitantly has lost connotative precision. Second, it insinuates that the study of uneven STR might have been or could be conducted through comparisons of cases that are not necessarily analogous – posing,

[12] This is a state which, following Mann (1986), has low infrastructural power.

in turn, challenges for valid causal inference. Third, and perhaps most important, it reveals that different types of uneven STR do exist in reality (even within a given country) and that current scholarship has lacked well-defined concepts to systematically capture these varied situations. Given that empirical differentiation is a precondition for accurate theory building and sound theory testing (Munck 2006; D. Collier, et al. 2012), we argue that a new and more refined concept is needed in order to systematically capture the different instances in which STR is uneven.

To do so, we contend that STR needs to be seen as relational interaction. We claim that STR is an intrinsically political and distributive outcome that results from confrontations and compromises between national state officials who seek to expand state authority over peripheral (meaning subnational) territories, and the territorial challengers who seek to resist it. This definition resonates with the research on state formation. Traditional scholarship on state building sees the construction of modern states, and concomitantly the territorial projection of state authority, as a bargaining outcome (Hintze 1975b; Tilly 1975, 1990; Downing 1992; Ertman 1997; Boone 2003, 2007; Berman 2011; Soifer 2015). Historical processes of state making and state territorial expansion, such as by the French or British, were characterized by political bargains between monarchs (and their agents) and entrenched subnational elites over the control of territory. In these two cases, rulers' attempts to outmaneuver, undermine, or destroy the territorial control of local elites over subnational (peripheral) territories were fiercely counterattacked and confronted by subnational elites (Tilly 1975, 1990; Parker and Smith 1997; Berman 2011). Yet the state's territorial reach, which eventually expanded over territorial dominions controlled by local elites, was achieved when monarchs employed coercion as well as cooptation strategies and compromises (Berman 2011).

Implicit in this definition of STR is the idea that state officials' power to control territory is not absolute but relative (Mann 1986). Therefore, if STR is a (violent or nonviolent) bargaining outcome, it invariably follows that, in order for the state to exert control over subnational/peripheral areas, territorial challengers' capacity to resist state authority needs to be low or nonexistent. We thus claim that in order to properly understand STR unevenness we must take into account both state officials and territorial challengers. This, we believe, is an important amendment to conventional scholarship on STR, which has generally focused on state actors exclusively (O'Donnell 1993; Centeno and Ferraro 2013; Kurtz 2013; Soifer 2015).

State officials' incentives *and* resources to control the territory	High	(I) Unrestricted STR	(II) Contested STR*
	Low	(IV) Unprojected STR	(III) Restricted STR*
		Low	High
		Incentives *and* resources of subnational nonstate actors (i.e., territorial challengers) to control parts of the territory	

* Contested and restricted STR are further unpacked into 2 subtypes each (see discussion below).

FIGURE 4.1 Ideal Types of State Territorial Reach (STR)

Closely related to this first implication is the idea that the expansion and/or retrenchment of STR are determined by state officials' and territorial challengers' incentives and access to resources. If STR is an outcome resulting from clashes and/or deals between national state officials and territorial challengers, the reach of the state can only expand (retrench) when state officials have (lack) the resources and incentives to potentially control peripheral territory *and* when territorial challengers lack (have) the resources and incentives to neutralize state officials' territorial reach.[13] It follows that the analysis of STR inevitably has to incorporate the access to resources and incentives that both actors possess.

Drawing on the ideas that STR is a political and distributive outcome, that the power of state officials to control the territory is not absolute but relative, and that territorial challengers, as well as their incentives and resources, are all critical for understanding STR, we propose the four-cell typology displayed in Figure 4.1. The terms in each cell capture the constellations of attributes defined by each of the two dimensions, and yield four ideal types of STR: (I) unrestricted, (II) contested, (III) restricted, and (IV) unprojected. Of these four ideal types, II, III, and IV denote instances of uneven STR. Type I, instead, indicates a situation of even STR.

Before describing each ideal type, a word about state officials' and challengers' incentives and resources is in order. A core assumption of this

[13] We assume that actors' interests and resources evolve in conjunction (meaning that they are jointly present or jointly absent). We elaborate on the implications of this assumption below.

chapter is that actors' incentives and resources are either jointly present or jointly absent. This simplifying assumption is problematic because it can mask potential causal relationships between these two drivers of STR expansion or retrenchment. On the one hand, it can be the case that resources can be developed if incentives arise. Militarily weak state actors could muster war resources if incentives to combat insurgents outweigh the costs of not battling them. On the other hand, it is possible that incentives to expand or neutralize STR are high but that lack of access to institutional, military, or economic resources trumps actors' determination to extend or retrench STR. In sum, assuming that incentives and resources are jointly present or jointly absent may seriously complicate the analysis of STR.

In spite of these difficulties, the assumption that incentives and resources are jointly present or jointly absent does not undermine the main heuristic and analytic contributions of the typology. The identification of different STR types is still valid if state actors and challengers are driven by either (or both) the incentives or resources to expand STR. Therefore, from an analytic and descriptive point of view, the four ideal types of STR still hold regardless of whether actors are driven by either (or both) incentives or resources. The adjudication of whether it is incentives or resources (or both) that generate a given STR type is an empirical task. Contextualized empirical analysis that relies on backward induction and careful process tracing seems a promising way to tease out whether incentives and/or resources (or both) are the main factors accounting for STR expansion and/or retrenchment.

Uneven STR Ideal Types

Unrestricted STR (Quadrant I) arises under two conditions: when state officials have incentives and muster the resources to expand their authority throughout the territory and, when, at the same time, territorial challengers either do not exist or have neither the resources nor the incentives to counteract the territorial reach of the state. One of the main characteristics of unrestricted STR is that territory is not disputed. Under unrestricted STR, state authorities have absolute domain control. This type of STR resembles O'Donnell's (1993) famous depiction of "blue areas," where a high degree of state presence exists throughout the whole territory.

Contested STR (Quadrant II) takes place where state officials, who have both the incentives and the financial, military, and/or institutional

resources to penetrate the territory, cannot extend their territorial reach due to the high capacity of challengers to neutralize the state's territorial control. This is a situation where, following Kalyvas (2006), state officials and territorial challengers exercise limited control over the same realm, evidencing a parity or stalemate between state officials and challengers.[14]

The literature on civil wars has been prolific in identifying different subtypes of fragmented control, or what we call contested STR. Here we draw on Staniland's (2012) typology of fragmented-control wartime political orders to further unpack contested STR. He proposes a classification that distinguishes among three alternative scenarios, each of which denotes a parity between state officials and insurgents. The first type, *collusion*, refers to a situation in which, due to stalemate, the state actively cooperates with nonstate armed actors (he refers to this interaction as state–insurgent cooperation). The second type, *tacit coexistence*, denotes a situation of parity that involves the interweaving of state and nonstate violent organizations in areas of overlapping control, and in which there are careful attempts to limit the degree of active conflict and violence between states and nonstate armed groups in intermixed daily life.[15] Finally, the third type, *guerrilla disorder*, is a situation in which both are powerful and in which, due to lack of collusion and tacit coexistence, state officials and insurgents operate in a situation of fluid violence. Under this type, there are few clear norms or rules about the infliction of lethal violence when insurgent and state forces are intertwined in the same political space.[16]

Building on these insights we argue that contested STR can be divided into two subtypes. The first subtype, which we label "open-contested STR," parallels, for the most part, Staniland's (2012) "guerrilla disorder" category. It denotes a situation in which national state officials actively seek to fend off challengers' capacity/incentives to retake control of the contested territory. Unlike Staniland, however, we argue that open-contested STR should not be exclusively circumscribed to contexts of civil war. Open, albeit nonviolent, confrontations can exist between state officials and unarmed territorial challengers. Therefore, we distinguish between violent open-contested STR and nonviolent open-contested STR.[17]

[14] Kalyvas (2006) refers to this situation as "fragmented control."

[15] Staniland (2012) refers to this interaction as state–insurgent passive cooperation.

[16] Staniland (ibid.) terms this type of interaction "state–insurgent no cooperation."

[17] Staniland's tacit coexistence and collusion types are not regarded as possible contested STR subtypes because both presume situations whereby both state actors and territorial challengers have, for different reasons, reached an agreement on who controls the territory. This outcome, according to our definition of STR, is not possible. Recall that we define STR as a zero-sum game among state actors and challengers.

The second contested STR subtype, which we label "within-state STR," also departs significantly from Staniland's typology. Drawing on the literature on state capacity, we acknowledge the existence of principal–agent problems in the interaction between national and local state actors.[18] According to this strand of research, the state is seen as relying on multiple agents to exert control over the periphery. Police forces and bureaucrats, to name a few, are responsible for implementing territorial control to their fullest ability in subnational units. Yet, it is also possible that subnational agents decide to carry out policies that directly contradict and undermine the national state's intention (capacity) to control territory. In this type of situation, with a principal–agent problem, we are likely to observe a modified type of collusion, "local collusion," whereby local state officials collude with territorial challengers to neutralize the territorial presence of the national state in a given territory.[19] In sum, contested STR, a situation that denotes "strong" state officials and "strong" territorial challengers, can subsequently take the form of open-contested (violent or nonviolent) or within-state contested STR.

Restricted STR (Quadrant III) occurs where state elites have low incentives to penetrate the territory, due, for instance, to geographical factors (such as the existence of difficult-to-access regions) or demography (such as the existence of underpopulated peripheral zones), and do not have the resources (such as those who lack military power or economic assets) to project state authority. This lack of incentives and resources coexists with powerful territorial challengers who can effectively control parts of the territory and eventually supplant the state in the provision of political authority, public order, and/or public goods.[20] This type of STR matches fairly well with O'Donnell's "brown areas," where the presence

[18] Although scholars of civil war often explicitly recognize the perils of modeling state–insurgent interactions through unified actors, they usually (and logically, given their research foci) opt for more parsimonious analytics.

[19] Although logically possible, other configurations seem less empirically frequent (for example, a situation in which national-level authorities decide to collude with a local challenger, but such decision is not implemented due to resistance by local state agents). Additional subtypes could be identified in future applications of this typology.

[20] Some of them, like the rebels of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMNL) in El Salvador (Wood 2003), provided healthcare, education, and dispute-resolution schemes to civilians, among others. By contrast, other factions from the FMNL ruling elsewhere in El Salvador raided and looted the population without ever setting up a system of civilian administration.

of the republican state is attenuated and more arbitrary forms of power hold sway (1993). One of the main characteristics of this STR type is that, as with unrestricted STR, territory is not disputed.

For this type of STR we also identify two subtypes. The first subtype, which we label "pure-restricted STR," denotes a situation whereby territorial challengers, rather than state authorities, have absolute control over territory and the population. This restricted STR subtype has typically been identified in studies of civil wars, in which territorial challengers, typically armed rebels, displace the central state from the territory. We argue that a very similar situation can occur in nonviolent contexts. That is, subnational state officials, such as undemocratic governors, can take over the territory without necessarily resorting to arms and waging open war against the central state. In sum, like the open-contested STR subtype, we distinguish between violent and nonviolent pure-restricted STR.

The second subtype, here referred to as "mutualistic-restricted STR," denotes a situation in which state officials, unable to reach a given periphery, formally or informally hand over state sovereignty to powerful and recalcitrant territorial challengers and, by so doing, legitimate challengers' authority.[21] Historical examples of this subtype include Prussian Junkers, European feudal lords, and *encomenderos* pursuing colonization in Spanish America. Contemporary examples of this subtype include, among others, state-legitimized and -endorsed paramilitaries. In several cases, state officials have resorted to mutualistic arrangements with a territorial challenger to counteract the actions of a third challenger. In sum, restricted STR can take the form of pure-restricted STR or mutualistic-restricted STR.

Unprojected STR (Quadrant IV) comes about where state elites refrain from projecting the state's reach purely because there are neither incentives nor resources to do so. Officials do not experience threats emanating from territorial challengers, simply because they do not exist or because they are weak. This STR type shares one important characteristic with the restricted STR type, namely, the state is absent in peripheral regions. Yet, what differentiates this type from the previous one is that territory is not disputed. Under unprojected STR, state authorities abstain from penetrating peripheries because, as economists, political scientists, and geographers contend, the costs (and risks) of power projection outweigh

[21] In biology, a mutualistic arrangement denotes an "association between organisms of two different species in which each is benefited" (Encyclopedia Britannica: www.global.britannica.com, "Mutualism").

the benefits (and risks) of not doing so (Herbst 2000; Illife 1995; Alesina and Spolaore 2005; Dunning 2008; Yashar 2005). A central question is whether we find empirical support for these STR types and subtypes, an issue to which we now turn.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSES

In this section we conduct a set of empirical analyses to assess the potential analytical and empirical payoffs of the typology. Before turning to the empirics, a caveat about the indicators is in order. In order to empirically assess the typology's validity, we need to operationalize and measure the resources and incentives of state officials and challengers. This requires two sets of indicators: one that measures the state's incentives and resources to penetrate the territory, and a second that captures territorial challengers' resources/interests to resist such penetration.[22]

Whereas several proxies are available to measure the penetration of the state across countries/provinces/municipalities,[23] accurately measuring the capacity of challengers to resist penetration on a comparative basis is not yet possible, simply because the resources and interests to control territory of territorial challengers – such as drug traffickers, indigenous movements, and authoritarian governors or mayors – differ greatly from each other. For this reason, the empirical analysis is divided into two sections. We focus first on state officials' resources to penetrate the territory in a large number of countries, while ignoring the presence of local challengers to the state. The purpose of this analysis is to show that STR unevenness varies considerably across regions. In the second empirical section, we present a series of short vignettes that qualitatively illustrate different types of uneven STR, with examples from a set of four Latin American cases (Mexico, Argentina, Peru, and Paraguay). Altogether, our empirical analyses indicate that (a) uneven STR is a characteristic of regions such as Africa and Latin America, but not Europe, (b) the states in Mexico, Argentina, Peru, and Paraguay display, at the local level, different types of uneven STR that approximate those presented in the typology, and (c) these different STR types are caused by the different patterns of interactions between state officials and local challengers.

[22] See Soifer and vom Hau 2008 and Soifer 2012 for a similar discussion.

[23] These include, among others, extractive capacity, electricity provision, census administration, existence of roads, and provision of basic goods, such as vaccines, schooling, etc.

Even vs. Uneven STR

To explore the territorial penetration of states, we created a crossnational dataset composed of observations for 147 countries. For those countries, we describe the overall levels of electrification coverage in 2006. Electricity provision can be regarded as one indicator of institutional resources through which state penetration can be attained. Although we acknowledge that electrification might be privately produced or distributed, our results should at least be able to track states' differential capacity to either directly provide or regulate the provision of a basic public good, such as electrification. Data on electrification were compiled from satellite estimations of the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). NOAA estimations are based on consolidated annual lighting images (clean of clouds and fires). Therefore, a distinct (and positive) aspect of our dataset is that, unlike other possible indicators of state's territorial presence, it is not produced or reported by state sources.[24] Therefore, it could be considered as exogenous to overall levels of state strength.[25]

From the satellite electrification dataset we derive two different measures: total electrification rate and electrification territorial-inequality index (EII). First, a state's overall capacity to provide or regulate electricity is captured by each country's total electrification rate. This indicator is nationally invariant, and it is closely associated to a country's GDP (Min 2010). Second, drawing on annual lighting figures available at the regional level for each of the 147 countries, we analyze the degree to which subnational electrification is heterogeneously distributed across the territory. To do so, we created an EII that varies across subnational units in each country. The index uses a Gini coefficient formula, which denotes the extent to which electrification is equal/homogeneous (present at similar overall rates in all subnational units) or unequal/heterogeneous (that is, significantly more present in some subnational units than in others). Higher values of the index mean that electrification rates vary greatly across the subnational units within a given country.

Total electrification and EII are strongly correlated (–0.84). However, as shown in Figure 4.2, a large number of countries significantly deviate from

[24] See Min 2010 for a pioneering study analyzing this data source.

[25] Future versions of our proxy for the first dimension will be complemented with similar data measuring each country's road system. The data are not yet publicly available at NOAA, but have been announced as forthcoming.



FIGURE 4.2 Correlation Between Total Electrification Figures and Electrification Territorial-Inequality Index (EII)
Source: Authors' elaboration based on NOAA satellite data.

the regression line. Among these cases, African and Latin American states are the most consistent outliers, even when controlling for possible confounders such as population density or the presence of geographic obstacles to state penetration such as forests, deserts, or mountainous terrain.[26]

In spite of the correlation between our nationally invariant and our subnational indicator, a closer look at Figure 4.2 reveals the presence of

[26] We ran a series of correlation analyses without finding significant associations among these series of variables (obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators Dataset) and our electrification indicators. Interestingly, neither of our two measures is significantly correlated to possibly consequential geographical or productive features, such as the percentage of land devoted to agriculture (0.11) or the percentage of forest areas in the country (0.13). Nonetheless, the percentage of urban population is significantly correlated to our indexes (–0.63, 0.7). Hence, it should be noted that both estimations provide measures on the levels of state penetration irrespective of population distribution in the territory, which are obviously consequential for observed patterns. Our indicators are thus closer to an "absolute" degree of territorial reach than to a "ceteris paribus" estimation controlling for population distribution.



FIGURE 4.3 Regional Averages of Total Electrification and Electrification Territorial-Inequality Index (EII) (Calibrated 0–2 Measures)
Source: Authors' elaboration based on NOAA satellite data.

interesting patterns, which seem to be region-specific. For the sake of presentation, Figure 4.3 displays a calibrated version of both indicators, and identifies the presence of stylized combinations of national and subnational electrification rates.[27] As shown in Figure 4.3, African states have few resources to penetrate the territory (the lowest total electrification rates) and display high levels of territorial variability, denoting that electrification rates vary widely across the territory (the lowest scores in the EII). Advanced industrialized countries display high resources to penetrate the territory and low EII, showing that electrification rates are extremely homogeneous across subnational units. Latin American states, in turn, have relatively high overall levels of electrification (similar to those displayed by East European countries),

[27] To calibrate our original indicators we recoded each case position in the distribution of each variable into terciles, which could be read as low = 0, medium = 1, and high = 2.



FIGURE 4.4 National-Level and Subnational Electrification Inequality (Latin America)
Source: Authors' elaboration based on NOAA satellite data.

but relatively high territorial variation in terms of the electrification rates prevalent in subnational units.

Let us now focus more closely on Latin America. Figure 4.4 displays both indexes for the Latin American cases for which the two electrification indicators are available. As shown in Figure 4.4, strong associations between both indicators exist at each extreme of the distribution (meaning cases with high levels of overall electrification tend to display low levels of territorial heterogeneity and vice versa). Yet, at intermediate levels, the association between the two measures is weaker. For instance, while Bolivia displays less national-level electrification than Mexico, the latter displays significantly more heterogeneity at the subnational level than the former. In short, although very preliminary and incomplete, this first empirical exploration suggests at least three implications: (a) territorial unevenness, in spite of intermediate to high levels of resources for territorial penetration, seems to be a characteristic trait of Latin American countries; (b) at intermediate levels of state resources, countries vary a great deal regarding such territorial unevenness; and (c) the observed variance is apparently not attributable to geographic or population dynamics.

Alternative Types of Uneven STR

As noted above, the incapacity to incorporate a measure for challengers' incentives and resources to challenge the state and the limited scope of the indicator used to measure state's resources to penetrate throughout the territory are two key limitations that hinder the crossnational empirical analysis. In what follows, we seek to complement the analysis on uneven STR by relying on a series of specific examples drawn from four Latin American countries: Argentina, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru. The focus on contemporary Latin America is justified by the fact that in this region of the world a wide variety of territorial challengers have sought to neutralize the state's territorial reach. As Centeno and Ferraro (2013) note, contrary to past decades, contemporary territorial challengers in Latin America are not just armed insurgencies. Apart from armed groups, these challengers include drug traffickers and local police forces who neutralize the state's presence at the subnational level, undemocratic governors who insulate their provinces from national state penetration, and indigenous groups who reject state intervention. In sum, given the existence of both armed and nonarmed challengers in present-day Latin America, we believe this region is the perfect setting to show that our typology is applicable to contexts in which armed conflict is present and where it is lacking. This further reveals that the typology can be equally useful to scholars interested in the study of political authority in civil war, democratic consolidation, the rule of law, and/or state capacity.

The countries under analysis also provide significant variance regarding the resources and incentives available to state officials to exert control over the territory they nominally govern. Though we do not claim to have a representative sample, the countries from which we draw our examples display considerable variance regarding contextual conditions that might shape patterns of uneven STR. First, Peru and Paraguay are unitary regimes. Argentina and Mexico, by contrast, are federal countries that, by law, protect subnational jurisdictions and subnational actors (such as territorial challengers) from state encroachments. Second, Peru and Paraguay are among the poorest countries in South America, which implicitly suggests that state officials have fewer resources to project authority over a distance. In contrast, Argentina and Mexico stand among the most economically developed countries in the region, which by default should lead to state officials having greater resources to extend the reach of the state throughout the territory. Finally, the four countries differ in terms of national-level state capacity. Argentina is usually described as a case with historically high levels (Centeno and López-Alves 2001; Centeno 2003; Mahoney 2010; Kurtz 2013), whereas Paraguay and Peru are conspicuous cases of low-state capacity. Mexico lies at an intermediate position (Centeno 2003; Mahoney 2010; Centeno and Ferraro 2013; Kurtz 2013; Soifer 2015). Each case's positioning in Figure 4.4 complies with this characterization. Peru and Paraguay have lower overall electrification than Mexico and Argentina; although Argentina and Mexico have similar levels of overall electrification, Argentina displays less territorial unevenness than Mexico.

Contested STR in Mexico, Peru, and Argentina

Open-Contested STR in Peru

This subtype is defined by having strong territorial challengers and strong national state officials. Under this subtype, state officials, who have incentives and resources to penetrate the territory, cannot extend their territorial reach due to the high capacity of challengers to neutralize the state's control over the territory. As noted above, open-contested STR can lead either to violent conflict or to nonviolent confrontation. Whereas violent conflict is typically described in the civil war literature, nonviolent confrontation cases are often described in the literature on subnational undemocratic regimes.

Violent Open-Contested STR

The war in the Peruvian central highlands waged against Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) during the 1980s is a clear example of open-contested STR, in which the state's efforts to control the territory and the challengers' capacity to neutralize this control led to an escalation of military conflict and open violence. During the 1980s two powerful leftist guerrilla groups, the Tupac Amarú Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) of Cuban inspiration and Sendero Luminoso, a group of armed rebels with a Maoist orientation, waged war against the Peruvian state. In the mid 1980s, at the height of the conflict, the two rebel groups successfully took over the Peruvian highlands (Kirk 1997; Paponnet-Cantat 1991; Degregori, et al. 1996; Palmer 1996; McClintock 1996). Toward the end of the decade, when many believed Sendero Luminoso to be at its strongest, the Peruvian state also considerably increased its resources used to combat the insurgency. Illustrating the increased military power of the Peruvian state, Soifer and Vieira (n.d.) report that military spending jumped by about 50 percent in 1980 and nearly tripled between 1981 and 1982.

While it shrank over the remainder of the Fernando Belaúnde administration (1980–85), it tripled from 1986 to 1987 under the Alan García administration (1985–90). A similar, although less pronounced increase was observed in the size of the armed forces, which also expanded during the 1980s (ibid.). By the turn of the decade, a powerful state and a powerful territorial challenger had clashed in a violent conflict that resulted in stalemate, thus leading to open-contested STR.

Nonviolent Open-Contested STR

Regime juxtaposition is one of the distinctive characteristics of many democracies in Latin America. Following Edward Gibson (2005), regime juxtaposition refers to the coexistence of a national democratic regime alongside subnational undemocratic regimes (SURs).[28] In countries where regime juxtaposition exists, and where presidents lack resources to circumvent and discipline subnational undemocratic rulers, the latter can act as territorial gatekeepers to prevent national state officials from operating and implementing (national) laws and procedures in subnational territories.

The interactions between national state officials and autocrats in the Argentinian province of San Luis provide an instance of open-contested STR characterized by a nonviolent clash between the state and its territorial challengers.[29] The province of San Luis has been a fortress impenetrable to national state officials. Notwithstanding twenty-eight consecutive years of hegemonic rule by the Rodríguez Saá brothers from the Partido Justicialista (PJ or Peronist Party), in the late 1990s the provincial regime began to allow the local opposition to win office in several municipalities, including the province's capital. These local victories created favorable conditions for infiltration by national state officials. Taking advantage of this window of opportunity, President Néstor Kirchner (2003–07) from the newly created party Front for Victory (FpV), a splinter of the national PJ, sided with the capital's mayor, who was a staunch opponent of the Rodríguez Saás. In an effort to strengthen this political alliance, President Kirchner – one of Argentina's most fiscally powerful rulers – directed abundant federal funds and subsidies to the capital city's mayor (Giraudy 2013, 2015). These resources solidified the national–local alliance and, as

[28] SURs are civilian electoral regimes characterized by the use and abuse of incumbent authority in order to prevent the opposition from taking office (Giraudy 2013).

[29] The following description draws extensively on Giraudy 2013 and 2015.

importantly, contributed to increasing Kirchner's political clout and the federal state's presence in the province.

Yet, such a presence was rapidly neutralized through nondemocratic and semi-illegal maneuvers. Ignoring completely the right of the capital city's mayor to call for municipal elections, the governor announced his own electoral calendar. Elections in the capital were held twice in 2003, as both the mayor (backed by the national government) and the governor followed their own calendars, fielded their own candidates, and elected their respective mayors. After the two elections were held, two mayors ruled San Luis City, the city had two seats of government, citizens were required to pay local taxes to two mayoralties, and municipal employees were forced to work for two different patrons. These developments configured a situation of (nonviolent) open-contested STR.

Within-State Contested STR in Peru, Paraguay, Mexico, and Argentina

As described above, this subtype of contested STR emerges as a result of principal–agent problems. Within-state contested STR is characteristic of places where local state officials, local state agencies, or local bureaucrats collude with territorial challengers and subvert national state officials' control over the territory.

Examples of within-state contested STR abound in contemporary Peru. The valley of the Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro Rivers (VRAEM) and the Alto Huallaga valley in the central highlands of Peru are two of the most relevant locations where coca leaves are currently produced and commercialized. According to recent estimates, Peru is now the largest producer of coca bush in the world, with approximately 62,500 hectares dedicated to the production of that crop (UNODC 2012). Increasingly, coca leaf and its byproducts have been exported to the north through the use of small aircraft. Those exports are destined for the United States and usually pass over Colombia and Central America and/or Mexico. According to Peruvian national-level officials from the Ministry of Interior and from Peru's Anti-Drug Agency, 70 percent of the clandestine landing sites in the VRAEM and Alto Huallaga are controlled by deployed military personnel, who charge between US$ 10,000 to US$ 20,000 for every landing or takeoff.[30] Although national officials are informed about the collusion between local military personnel and narcotrafficking organizations, and frequently rotate their personnel to reduce

[30] Authors' interviews with two former interior ministers and with agents of PROVIDA (Peru's anti-drug bureau), March 2014.

the odds that the deployed military will collude with drug dealers, top-rank officials sitting in Lima have struggled to overcome the principal–agent problem they confront in both regions. Despite the fact that the Peruvian state has invested resources (in the form of manpower) to penetrate and take over these regions, collusion of the deployed military personnel with narcotraffickers has prevented the central state from extending its rule in VRAEM and Alto Huallaga.

A similar situation was described to us when interviewing an organized-crime attorney and the anti-drug team leader in Paraguay, both of whom were jointly appointed and paid by the Paraguayan state and by the US anti-drug agency (DEA). While discussing their capacity to pursue operations against organized crime in areas in which narco-trafficking organizations were strong, they (independently) referred to their incapacity to rely on virtually any state official who was not under their direct control. In the words of one: "The moment I pick up the phone to talk to the local police, I know I am also speaking to the mayor, local judicial officials, congress members from that region, as well as the dominant organized crime group. They are all virtually the same people!"[31]

Similar situations to those existing in Peru and Paraguay exist elsewhere in Latin America. Quintessential examples of collusion between local agents of national (or provincial) security forces and territorial challengers exist in Mexico and Argentina (Dewey 2012; Auyero 2007). In Mexico, as documented extensively and in detail by Trejo and Ley (2014), local state officials from federal security forces and the Procuraduría General de la República colluded with, protected, and cooperated with members of drug cartels, thus operating in ways that undermined the implementation of federal strategies aimed at combating drug trafficking. Recently, in the aftermath of the Iguala tragedy, in which police forces were responsible for the kidnapping and disappearance of forty-five Mexican students, President Enrique Peña-Nieto (2012–present) decided to "dissolve" municipal police forces in Mexico.[32] The justification for such a decision was directly tied to the federal government's recognition of its incapacity to control local police forces that collude with organized

[31] Authors' interview with the Paraguay Attorney General's Office for Organized Crime and a top official of the SENAD (Secretaría Nacional Anti-Drogas), Asunción (June 2013).

[32] Municipal police forces in Mexico were organized around 1,800 police districts and were staffed by at least 170,000 officers. See internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2014/11/27/actualidad/1417116838_759316.html.

crime to fend off effective state presence at the local level. These instances, in our view, represent cases of within-state contested STR.

Restricted STR in Contemporary Mexico

Nonviolent Pure-Restricted STR in Oaxaca

As noted above, this subtype of uneven STR denotes instances where specific regions of countries are de facto ruled and controlled by territorial challengers, and where state officials lack political authority to implement decisions in these domains. This type of uneven STR is typically associated with countries suffering from civil war and where local armed rebels have taken over territory that nominally belongs to the central state. As illustrated by the case of Mexico before drug-related violence peaked in 2008, restricted STR is also possible in contexts of low violence.

The combination of a weak president who lacks resources for territorial penetration and a strong and powerful undemocratic governor who, in contrast, stands in a strong position to defend provincial borders, can lead to pure-restricted STR. As noted by several scholars, this was the prevailing situation in the Mexican state of Oaxaca during the years of Vicente Fox's administration (2000–06). The state of Oaxaca, located in southern Mexico, has been regarded as the quintessential example of an undemocratic enclave in democratic Mexico (E. Gibson 2005; Benton 2012; Giraudy 2010, 2015; Durazo 2010).

An eloquent example of the capacity of subnational autocrats to neutralize the ability of national state officials to implement (national) policy in Oaxaca occurred in 2002, two years after Mexico transitioned to democracy. In August of that year, officials from the Ministry of Social Development (Sedesol) were kidnapped in the Oaxacan city of Mitla. The kidnapping occurred when Sedesol officials and Oaxacan mayors from the Partido de Acción Nacional (National Action Party, or PAN) met to discuss strategies to deter the discretional distribution of nationally funded social programs carried out by the incumbent governor of the Partido de la Revolución Institucional (PRI). "All of a sudden," as one of the kidnappees reported, "the doors of the meeting room were opened and Ulises Ruiz [then federal senator of Oaxaca, and subsequently governor of the state], leading a crowd of 100 PRI mayors, burst into the room, violently apprehended us, and took us away in a pickup truck." The governor's aim, as the interviewee reported, "was to demonstrate [to] my boss [Josefina Vázquez Mota, Secretary of Sedesol, 2000–06], that PAN federal officials could not meddle in Oaxacan politics, much less

dictate to the governor how federal social programs should be distributed" (Giraudy 2015, 1). Indirectly, José Murat (the Oaxacan governor) also wanted to send a clear message: PAN president Vicente Fox was not to encroach upon the governor or the state of Oaxaca.

Mutualistic-Restricted STR in Michoacán and Guerrero (Mexico)

This subtype of restricted STR denotes situations whereby state officials who lack the capacity to reach a given locality hand over state authority to a locally powerful challenger. The Grupos de Autodefensa Comunitaria (communitarian groups of self-defense, the Autodefensas) – that is, civilian actors engaged in armed self-defense active in the Mexican states of Michoacán and Guerrero – are perhaps the most eloquent examples of this subtype.[33] Early in 2013, seeking to protect civilians from the crimes (such as kidnappings, extralegal taxation, and an unofficial draft) perpetrated by drug cartels, several self-defense groups mushroomed in the country. According to a recent account, of the thirty-six new groups that emerged that year, most (twenty-four) were created in the states of Michoacán and Guerrero (Fuentes Díaz 2014; see also Valdivia García 2014). During 2013, the Autodefensas were successful in reclaiming approximately a third of the territory previously controlled by the Caballeros Templarios Cartel (a branch of the Familia Michoacana Cartel) (Valdivia García 2014).[34]

In light of the Mexican state's incapacity to control territory in Guerrero and Michoacán, and given the Autodefensas' relative success in fighting organized crime and their indirect contribution to advancing Mexico's official "war on drugs," Mexico's secretary for national defense (SEDENA) launched an initiative to officially register the Autodefensas and their armaments. The plan also included a proposal for merging the Autodefensas with Mexico's rural police forces. By doing so, the state formally endorsed a group of its territorial challengers in both states, pursuing a mutualistic arrangement to fight the drug cartels. State reach remains limited, however. Although several Autodefensas groups have

[33] Civilian self-defense groups in Mexico can be traced back to Benito Juarez's presidency (1858–72). They were also pivotal in repressing opposition forces in the countryside during the Porfiriato (a dictatorial regime headed by Porfirio Díaz between 1876 and 1911) and were reintroduced during the years of the Mexican Revolution (1910–17) and in its aftermath (Vanderwood 1986).

[34] Fuentes Díaz (2014) shows that, in every military victory, the Autodefensas were able to obtain better and more powerful armaments than the defeated cells of the Caballeros Templarios.

voluntarily registered, others remain "illegal"(Fuentes Díaz 2014). In either case, these self-defense groups at least tacitly cooperate with the Mexican state to help the state reclaim its territorial control of areas in which organized-crime cartels (and the Autodefensas) are significantly more powerful than formal state officials.

Unprojected STR in Paraguay

This type of uneven STR comes about where state elites refrain from projecting the state's reach simply because there are neither incentives nor resources to do so. Officials do not experience threats emanating from territorial challengers, simply because they do not exist or because they are weak. The case of the Paraguayan Chaco nicely illustrates this STR type.

Historically, the Amazon basin and the Chaco boreal region have been characterized as Latin American regions with very low levels of state presence (for examples, see Bunker 1985; Yashar 2006). The Chaco region is where the borders of Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina meet. The Paraguayan Chaco region is contemporarily described as one of "open borders" between Brazil, Bolivia, and Paraguay, given the incapacity of the Paraguayan state to control its legal frontier (Glauser 2009). Such incapacity has been recently exacerbated by the effects of the so-called commodity boom observed in Latin America during the 2000s. The boom, which was driven by international demand for the region's primary products, has produced an expansion of the productive frontier further into previously untapped regions such as the Amazonian forest, mining sites in the Andean highlands, and the Chaco region. The externalities resulting from the interaction between the state's meager territorial presence and expanding economic activities in the area exemplify the implications of unprojected STR.

The Paraguayan land registry covers only around 70 percent of the country's territory, with the remaining 30 percent falling within the forested Chaco border region with Bolivia (Palau 2009; Glauser 2009). Moreover, the official registry is plagued by significant inconsistencies, caused by the presence of duplicitous "official" titles over land. Those competing titles were awarded under different political administrations that claimed to pursue "land reform" (Hetherington 2011). Lacking an official and consistent registry, the Paraguayan state is consequently unable to award and enforce property rights or to arbitrate private-party land conflicts. The latter have increased under the commodity boom due

to the expansion of the agricultural frontier and the rising price of rural landholdings. Lacking an official registry, the Paraguayan state is also largely unable to tax rural landholdings. As reported by interviewees, the Paraguayan economic elite describes tax compliance as "voluntary." Instead, landowners increasingly turn to private law firms that, in exchange for a yearly fee equivalent to landowners' tax dues, are ready to litigate (legally and extralegally) if a competing title-holder questions landowners' property rights.[35] In a nutshell, the Paraguayan state, due to its unprojected STR, has not acquired the capacity to successfully arbitrate conflicts among private parties.

CONCLUSION

This chapter echoes Centeno, Kohli, and Yashar's notion that *political action* and *social context* and their interaction with state institutions are key variables to explain state capacity and state performance for development. Here we have focused on one specific aspect of state capacity: the state's territorial reach. We have argued and shown that STR is shaped by territorial challengers' resources and incentives to neutralize the territorial expansion of the state, and vice versa. Drawing on this insight, the chapter has put forward a new typology that identifies a multiplicity of types of uneven STR. The typology, in turn, provides new conceptual labels to systematically identify and name these different instances of uneven STR. This concluding section reflects on the implications for future research on uneven STR that can be derived from both the relational notion of STR and the typology presented in this chapter. We first discuss the potential payoffs of the new conceptualization of STR; we then turn to analyzing the benefits of the typology. Throughout the section we discuss opportunities for future research on uneven STR.

The notion of STR as a political and distributive outcome that results from compromises and clashes between state officials and territorial challengers suggests, first and foremost, that the reach of the state is dynamic in nature. STR can expand or retrench depending on state officials' and challengers' relative access to resources and to the relative prevalence of state officials' and challengers' incentives. This understanding of STR runs counter to the teleological view that sees its expansion as

[35] Authors' interviews with two representatives from a law firm specializing in rural investments for foreign clients, and a state attorney specializing in narcotrafficking and organized crime.

a linear and incremental process whereby state elites that start with low STR invariably move to higher stages of territorial reach, up to a definitive endpoint that marks the full development of their capacity to penetrate the territory. Quite the contrary, because state officials' and territorial challengers' relative power and their incentives can vary over time and change rather quickly (due to, for instance, the assistance of foreign powers or emerging opportunities for profitable economic activities), the expansion of STR can very likely be reversible.

We believe this dynamic view of STR expansion and retrenchment at the local level can offer a promising complement to existing theories on state capacity that rely heavily on path-dependent narratives and that therefore tend to overlook rapid changes at the subnational level. The rapid STR retrenchment (or expansion) that is seen in countries such as contemporary Mexico (or contemporary Colombia) where STR was unrestricted (or restricted) in the not-so-distant-past can be better grappled with and explained by the analytical lens we offer in this chapter than by the slow-moving, locked-in feedback loops that characterize path-dependent accounts. Future research on STR that adopts the analytic lens that we propose in this chapter could certainly craft alternative accounts and obtain more analytic leverage than scholarship that relies on historical causes.

At the outset of this chapter, we argued that the capacity of state officials to control the territory should not be viewed in absolute terms. Rather, state officials' capacity and incentives to control the territory are relative to challengers' resources and incentives. Based on this claim, we contend that the focus on these two actors, rather than on state actors exclusively, can render an entirely different understanding of STR dynamics. It is typically the case that state officials, who at time $t+1$ have access to more economic resources and who are able to deploy more troops across the territory than at time $t+0$, are seen as having greater capacity, over time, to control peripheral territory. However, if state actors' potential for territorial control is conceived relative to territorial challengers' dominion over space and resources, the state's access to greater resources is worthless if, simultaneously, state/nonstate subnational actors have disproportionally increased their resources to control a given territory. That is, in spite of being more capable in absolute terms, state officials might be prevented from controlling the territory overall.[36]

[36] This is exactly what occurs in contemporary Mexico, according to an interview conducted by Agustina Giraudy with a top official from the Secretaría de Gobernación in Mexico City in October 2012.

The relational nature of STR, which we claim is more appropriate for accurately assessing the territorial reach of the state, requires that STR be measured in a more sophisticated fashion. New measures seeking to capture the interactive dynamic that shapes STR inevitably have to rely on indicators that tap into both state officials' and territorial challengers' resources and incentives.[37] Developing such measures is perhaps the most pressing challenge facing future research on STR. Measuring states' incentives/resources to control their territory (in one single country or across cases) is less problematic than mapping the presence and strength of territorial challengers. Given that state territorial penetration has been typically assessed on the basis of national state officials' capacity for penetration exclusively, there are several proxies available to quantify this.[38] However, measuring territorial challengers' resources/incentives to control territory can be considerably more difficult. As noted at the outset, challengers can be state and nonstate officials, such as autocratic governors or indigenous movements; they can also be armed or unarmed, as in the case of warlords or peaceful minority ethnic groups who demand communal models of governance. Obtaining and systematizing data to measure challengers' resources are difficult because (a) each of these actors has access to a wide variety of resources, (b) some of these resources are illegal or intangible (as in the case of challengers who resort to appeals based on indigenous/aboriginal ancestry to reclaim territory), (c) multiple territorial challengers can exist within a given country, in which case it would be difficult to amass data that measure all of them, and (d) obtaining and processing subnational-level data is typically more challenging than getting national-level data. In spite of these obstacles, recent scholarship has shown that measuring territorial challengers' resources to neutralize STR is difficult but still possible (see, for instance, Trejo and Ley 2014; Giraudy 2015; Soifer and Vieira n.d.).

Turning to the typology, we argue that it can make several important contributions to future research on uneven STR. First, as we also claimed at the beginning of the chapter, the typology provides the conceptual labels needed to systematically identify three alternative instances under which the territorial reach of the state is uneven. These conceptual

[37] See Soifer and vom Hau 2008 and Soifer 2012 for a similar discussion.

[38] Typical measures include, among others, taxation, provision of public goods, such as electricity coverage, vaccination, roads, schools, or capacity to implement basic public policies, such as the provision of security or the administration of the census across the territory.

containers not only help researchers capture different manifestations of STR unevenness but also, as importantly, prevent scholars from lumping together cases that have little in common. At the same time, the ideal types contribute to identifying the universe of cases that can productively and meaningfully be compared. Cases that fall under contested STR, for instance, should be clearly distinguished from cases that meet the criteria of restricted STR, as it is clear that each set of cases belongs to very different species. Each type has different origins, dynamics, and implications, and these should be properly compartmentalized for the sake of crafting more precise theories about each type. Instead of elaborating general theories about uneven STR, we advocate for theoretical refinement and "specialization" in uneven STR types and subtypes. The four subtypes we identified in this chapter (two for contested STR and two for restricted STR) exemplify the ways in which the analysis of different configurations within each cell could be advanced in future works.

The typology we propose in this chapter has the additional advantage of being portable across levels of analysis. Even though we center on the political and distributive interactions between national state officials and subnational state/nonstate actors, the typology is portable across different types of jurisdictions or levels of aggregation. That is, subnational state officials who have authority to rule over any given territorial jurisdiction, such as provincial governors, regional presidents, departmental governors, and/or mayors, can and do engage in conflicts and bargains with local state and nonstate actors. At the same time, challenger presence can overlap or not with jurisdictional boundaries (in some cases, challenger activities encompass several jurisdictions; in others, they concentrate in a fraction of a jurisdiction's territory).[39] As a result, different uneven STR ideal types get configured within specific regions, provinces, departments, municipalities, or even neighborhoods.

A final word about challengers is in order. For the sake of parsimony, in this chapter we have assumed that state officials confront one single type of challenger at a time. This has allowed us to characterize specific instances of challenger–state interactions in somewhat simplified terms. In fact, the existence of multiple types of challengers and multiple uneven STR ideal types within a given country – far from complicating the analysis – opens up the door for a necessary refinement of our understanding

[39] See Snyder and Durán-Martínez (2009) for a thorough analysis of different jurisdictional configurations and their possible implications for violent/nonviolent state–challenger interactions.

of uneven STR and for better identifying the predominant traits of different uneven STR configurations that can be simultaneously present in a given country. We see the heuristic device proposed in this chapter as an initial step for future research on uneven STR. We believe that this typology will help scholars interested in this important phenomenon to systematically identify and theorize about different uneven STR types, their causes, and their possible consequences for crucial outcomes such as violence, corruption, the rule of law, and democracy.

5

Dictatorship and the State: A Comparison of State Building and State Plunder in South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand

Erik Martinez Kuhonta

If analysts of Park's Korea note "private agency with a public purpose," the common pattern under Marcos was public agency with a private purpose.

Paul D. Hutchcroft[1]

INTRODUCTION

One central insight that has come out of the comparative-development literature is that authoritarian regimes can provide public goods, such as economic development, social equality, and institution building. Huntington's monumental study was crucial in breaking the taboo against seeing some virtues to authoritarianism.[2] More recently, the literature on state capacity[3] and on the East Asian developmental state[4] furthered the claim that soft authoritarianism has been central to economic growth in several newly industrializing countries. Despite the tendency of some scholars to persist in dismissing authoritarian regimes *'tout court,'*[5] the record is quite clear: Authoritarian regimes in countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Singapore, and Meiji Japan were successful in advancing economic growth, reducing inequality, and fostering strong rational institutions.

I would like to thank participants at the Delhi and Oxford workshops for their comments, as well as two anonymous referees.

[1] Hutchcroft 2011, 568. [2] Huntington 1968. [3] See especially Evans, et al. 1985. [4] Johnson 1987; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Woo-Cumings 1999; Kohli 2004. [5] Morrow, et al. 2008; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012.